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1. INTRODUCTION
In various colleaive decision makings many voting systems are adopted as amethod of
putting opinions of all members together. In such acase it is very important to get the
influence of each member upon acolective decision making quantitatively because of the
following reasons :
(1) We want to know the influence itself of each member in order to utilze it on the
negotiation with other members.
(2) By looking over the power indices of all members, we want to make afair judgment on
the right or wrong of the voting system, that is, the voting system, in which the power
indices are unfair, should be unused.
(3) When we intend to share the common profit or cost in proportion to the influence of
each member, it is very important for each member to get the power indices correctly.
Various power indices have been proposed, for example,
(i) The Shapley-Shubik index (the S-S index) [5]
(ii) The Banzhaf index (the $\mathrm{B}$ index) [1]
(iii) The Coleman index (the $\mathrm{C}$ index) [3]
(iv) The Deegan-Packle index (the $\mathrm{D}\cdot \mathrm{P}$ index) [4]
(v) The Yamamoto-Nakai index (the $\mathrm{Y}\cdot \mathrm{N}$ index) [6]
Since these indices are presented with the axioms systems on which they are based, their
backgrounds and properties are clear. The advantages and disadvantages of these indioes
can’t be discussed theoreticaUy, for they are independent mutually and have equivalent
values. Then, applying one of them to the actual problem, it is desirable to decide which index
should be used according as the actual conditions.
The above five indices are related to avoting system with respect to achoice between the
ayes and nays, that is, they treat only the case of two alternatives. This fact is closely related
to the definition of acharacteristic function in acooperative game by von Neumann and
Morgenstern. Let $N$ be the set of players. Acharacteristic function $v(S)$ is defined on the
class of subsets of $N$ and means the max-min value of the expected payoff of the coaltion
$S(\subseteq N)$ in atwO-person game by two coalitions $S$ and $N-S$ Jn this situation there are
only two alternatives for each player, that is, belonging to the coalition $S$ and belonging to
$N-S$ .
On the other hand there are many voting systems with more than two alternafives, for
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example, the case that each member votes one of four policies proposed for resolving some
problem. Furthermore it happens frequently that in the election of assemblymen we vote one
ofmany candidates. In the case of considering the power of each player in avoting game with
multialtemative8 we can’t evaluate it correctly by the tradifional
$\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\epsilon\dot{\mathrm{h}}\mathrm{c}$ function
defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern. For example, we oonsider asimple majotity game
with seven voters $(a_{1},\cdots, a_{7})$ and three alternatives. Under the traditional
characteristic fimction aU $\infty \mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}$ composed of three voters are losing
$\infty \mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}$ and
therefore it is not evaluated at aU aflhlnafively to participate in a $\infty \mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ with three voters.
But in practice if the division with three $\infty \mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}\{a_{1},a_{2},a_{3}\},$ $\{a_{4},a_{\mathrm{S}}\},\{a_{6},a_{\mathfrak{l}}\}$ occurs, the
coalition $\{a_{1},a_{2},a_{3}\}$ wins though it is composed of three voters. Then the traditional
characteristic funcfion can’t evaluate oorrectly the power of each voters. In the case of
multialternatives, the relationship of cooperafion among players beoomes complicated and a
$\infty \mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ is formed for each altemative. As aresult, the set $N\mathrm{i}\epsilon$ divided into subsets
$N_{1},\cdots,N_{r}$ where $N_{l}$ is the set of supporters for alternative $i$ and acharacteristic function is
denoted by avector function $\{v_{1}(N_{1}),\cdots,v_{r}(N,)\}$ where $v_{i}(N_{i})$ means the expected payoff of
the coaltion $N_{l}$ under the division $\{N_{1},\cdots,N_{r}\}$ . In this way, the extension of the concept of
the traditional characteristic function is required.
With respect to asimple game with multialternatives, Bolger [2] proposes apower index,
together with its axioms system. The Bolger index is based on asimilar idea to the Shapley
value and does not treat aweighted voting $\mathrm{g}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}$. In this paper we propose another power
index which is an extension of the $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\cdot \mathrm{P}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}$ index to the case of $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{h}}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$ and
contains the case of aweighted vofing game. In Section 2the concept of asimple game with
multialternatives is introduoed and anew power index is proposed. In Section 3we show an
axioms system on which the new index is based.
2. ANEW POWER INDEX
Before proposing anew power index, we need to $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\alpha \mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{e}$ some notions.
$N=\{1,2,\cdots,n\}$ : aset ofplayers (voters)
$R=\{1,2,\cdots,r\}$ : aset of altematives
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We assume that each player votes only one alternative. As aresult, the set $N$ is divided to
$r$ subsets. Let $C=\{C(1),\cdots,C(r)\}$ be adivision of the set $N$ sati\S \Phi ing
$C(j)\cap C(k)=\emptyset$ $(j\neq k)$ , $\cup^{r}C(j)=Nj=1$
where $C(j)$ is the set of supporters for alternative $j$ and is caUed a $\infty \mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ . The number
of divisions is $r^{n}$ .
An electoral system is arule of deciding asuccessful alternative from the result of voting.
When adivision $C=\{C(1),\cdots,C(r)\}$ occurs and alternative $j$ is elected, the coaltion
$C(j)$ is caUed awinning coaltion (FC) and denoted by $W(C)$ . In general many winning
coalitions may exist, for example, there is acase that some alternatives in ahigher rank are
elected. But in this paper we concentrate our consideration on the case that the number of
sucoessffi alternatives is one at most. Awinning coalition $W(C)$ should $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\Phi$ the fouowing
two conditions :
(i) If $C(j)=N$ , then $C(j)=W(C)$ . That is to say, if aU players cooperate, they can
certainly win. Then under any electoral system there exists at least one division
having a $WC$ .
(\"u) The monotonicity: If a $WC$ only expands and other coalitions don’t expand, then
the expanded coaltion is also a $WC$ for the new division. Going into detafls, when
$W(C)=C(j)$ under adivision $C$ , we consider anew division
$C’=\{C’(1),\cdots,C’(r)\}$ where $C’(j)\supset C(j)$ and $C’(k)\subseteq C(k)$ for any $k(\neq j)$ . &
under the new division $C’,$ $C’(j)=W(C’)$ .
We consider aweighted voting game in which each player has the different number of votes
mutuauy. Let $d(i)$ be the number of votes belonging to player $i$ . Ifwe put
$||C(j)||= \sum_{j\epsilon C(j)}d(i)$ , (1)
then this denotes the number of votes obtained by alternative $j$ .
Casel :A $WC$ is defined as one selected randomly from coalifions maximizing the value
of $||C(j)||$ . In this case a $WC$ mlways exists.
Case2 :A $WC$ is defined as the coalition $C(j)$ satisfying
$||C(j)||> \frac{1}{2}\sum_{k=1}^{r}||C(k)||$ , (2)
that is, a $WC$ has amajority of the total number of votes. In this case it may
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oocur that there is no $WC$ .
Definition 1. Acharacteristic function is defined a8 an r-dimensional vector ffinction
$v(C)=\{v_{1}(C),\cdots,v_{r}(C)\}$ on the set of divisions.






When adivision $C=\{C(1),\cdots,C(r)\}$ occurs, the value of $v_{j}(C)$ means apayoff of the
$\infty \mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}C(j)$ Jn asimple game a $WC$ only can obtain apayoffone and other $\infty \mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}$ can
obtain payoff zero. In asimple game $(N,R,v)$ , if two sets $N$ and $R$ are fixed, we omit
them and indicate the game by the characteristic function $v$ only. Selecting one electoral
system means deciding acharacterisfic function and fidhermore corresponds to deciding a
$WC$ .
. Definifion 3. When aooaltion $C(i)$ is a $WC$ for adivision $C=\{C(1),\cdots,C(r)\},$ $C(j)$
is aminimal winning coalition (MWC) if and only if for any $h(\in C(J))$ , there is an





$C(k)$ $k\neq j,l$ .
(4)
Definition 3states that any player in the $MWC$ $c\mathit{0}$) can make alternah.ve $j$ be defeated
in the election by changing his support from alternative $j$ to another one. That is,
altemtive $j$ cannot be ele dffhe $\mathrm{i}\epsilon$ betrayed by someone in the $MWCC(j)$ .Then as an
indispensable member of the $MWC$ any member in the $MWC$ can aseert the same right as
other members. As aresult, the common profit one for the $MWC$ comes to be divided equally
among aU members in the $MWC$ .
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When a $WCC(j)$ is given, excluding au $\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}-\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}$ members for the success of
alternative $j$ from $C(j)$ , we can obtain a $MWC$ which is called an induced $MWC$ from $\mathrm{a}$
$WCC(j)$ and indicated by $I[C(j)]$ .
$G$ :aset of simple games with common sets $\mathrm{N}$ and $\mathrm{R}$
$W_{v}(C)$ :a $WC$ for a division $\mathrm{C}$ under asimple game $v$
$M_{v}(C)$ :a $MWC$ for a division $C$ under asimple game $v$
$\Gamma(v)$ :a set of divisions with a $mc$ under asimple game $v$
$\Gamma_{i}(v)$ :a set ofdivisions with a $MWC$ including player $i$ under asimple game $v$
Our new power index is derived from the foUowing five fundamental assumptions regarding
the behavior ofplayers :
(i) Only $MWC’ \mathrm{s}$ will emerge victorious.
(\"u) Each division with a $MWC$ has an equal probability of forming.
(\"ui) For $\mathrm{a}$ fixed division, a $MWC$ only can obtain the payoffone and the payoffi ofother
coaltions are zero.
(iv) The common profit $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{a}mc$ is divided equauy among au members in the $MWC$ .
(v) The power index for each player is proportional to his expected payoff.
We propose anew power index based on the above five assumpfions as follows :
$\rho_{l}(v)=\frac{1}{|\Gamma(v)|}\sum_{C\mathrm{e}\Gamma,(v)}\frac{1}{|C(\beta_{j})|}$ $(i=1,\cdots,n)$ (5)
where $|A|$ : the number of elements of asetA
$\beta_{l}$ : an alternative which player $i$ supports.
The index $\rho_{j}(v)$ denotes the degree of influence of player $i$ upon the coUective decision
making under asimple game $v$ with multialternatives. Note that the denominators of the
equation (5) are not zero.
3. THEA OMS SYSTKM
Though the new index $\rho_{l}(v)$ is derived from the idea of the above five assumptions, in
order to clarify it\S backgrounds and properties we shall show an axioms system on which
the new index is based. Before showing it, we need some definitions and lemmas.
Definition 4. In asimple game $(N,R,v)$ with multialternatives, we consider adivision
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$C=\{C(1),\cdots,C(r)\}.$ For any permutation $\sigma$ on $N$ , two definitions are introduoed.
(i) Anew pseudo division : $\sigma^{-1}(C)=\{\sigma_{1}^{-1}(C),\cdots,\sigma^{-1},(C)\}$
wh\mbox{\boldmath $\omega$} $\sigma_{j}^{-1}(C)=\{i|\sigma(i)\in C(j)\}$ .
Note that $\sigma^{-1}(C)$ is not an ordinary division because all members of
$\sigma^{-1}(C)$ don’t
neoes8ari1y support the alternative $\mathrm{j}$ . We defime awinning coalfion for the pseudo $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{i}\epsilon \mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$
$\sigma^{-1}(C)$ as fouows:
$\sigma_{j}^{-1}(C)=W_{v}(\sigma^{-1}(C))\Leftrightarrow C(j)=W_{v}(C)$.





Definition 5. Two games $v$ and $w(\in G)$ are mergeable if and only.if
$\Gamma(v)\cap\Gamma(w)=\phi$ .
Therefore if $v$ and $w$ are mergeable, then it is impossible that there exist altemtives $j$
and $k$ sati\S \mbox{\boldmath $\theta$}ing $C(j)=M_{v}(C)$ and $C(k)=M_{\nu}(C)$ simultaneously, including the case of
$j=k$ .
Definition 6. When two games $v$ and $u\in G$) are mergeable, aoombining game $v\mathrm{v}w$ is








$doesn’t\alpha ist$ if both $W_{v}(C)$ and $W_{\nu}(C)$ d n’t $\alpha ist$
$C(j)$ if $W_{\nu}(C)=C(j)$ and $W_{\nu}(C)Mn’t$aist(8)
$C(k)$ if $W_{w}(C)=C(k)$ and $W_{\nu}(C)$ d esnr exist.
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Remark 1. (i) Since $v$ and $w$ are mergeable, it is impossible that both $W_{v}(C)$ and
$W_{w}(C)$ exist.
(ii) The relation, which is obtained by exchanging $W$ (winning coaltion) with $\mathrm{M}$ (minimal
winning coalition) in the equation (8), is valid.
$\mathrm{L}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} 1$ . Iftwo games $v$ and $w(\in G)$ are mergeable, then
(i) $\Gamma(v\mathrm{v}w)=\Gamma(v)+\Gamma(w)$ (9)
(ii) $\Gamma_{i}(v\mathrm{v}w)=\Gamma_{i}(v)+\Gamma_{i}(w)$ $(i=1,\cdots,n)$ . (10)
PROOF. We prove the assertion (i) only since the assertion (ii) can be also proved sin$4\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{y}$.
From Remark 1(ii), we obtain
$M_{v^{\mathrm{v}}w}(C)=M_{v}(C)$ or M (C)
and therefore
$C\in\Gamma(v\mathrm{v}w)\Leftrightarrow C\in\Gamma(v)\cup\Gamma(w)$ .
On the other hand, because of the mergeabilty $\Gamma(v)\cap\Gamma(w)=\phi$.
Then $\Gamma(v\mathrm{v}w)=\Gamma(v)+\Gamma(w)$.
Under asimple game $v$ , let $L_{v}$ be the set of coaltions which is a $MWC$ for some division,
that is,
$L_{v}=\{M_{v}(C)|C\in\Gamma(v)\}$ . (11)
Numbering all elements of the set $L_{v}$ , we denote them by $M_{v}^{1},\cdots,M_{v}^{m}$ where $m=|L_{v}|$ .
Definition 7. For asimple game $v$ , singleton games $v^{k}(k=1,\cdots,m)$ are defined as
foUows :For adivision $C=\{C(1),\cdots,C(r)\}$ ,
$v^{k}(C)=\{v_{1}^{k}(C),\cdots,v_{r}^{k}(C)\}$ $(k=1,\cdots,m)$
where









$v^{k}(C)=\{0,\cdots,0\}$ for $a\varphi k(\neq l)$ . (14)
Furthemore we obtain
$M_{\sqrt}(C)=\{$
$M_{v}^{k}$ if $C\in\Gamma(v^{k})$ (15)
$doesn’t\alpha ist$ o’ e.
$\mathrm{L}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} 2$. Let $v^{1},\cdots,v^{n}$ be singleton games for asimple game $v$ .
(i) $v^{1},\cdots,v^{n}$ are mergeable mutuauy.
(ii) Asimple game $v$ is acombining game of its singleton games, that is ,
$v=v^{1}\mathrm{v}v^{2}\mathrm{v}\cdots \mathrm{v}v^{n}$ .
PROOF. (i) Since $\Gamma(\sqrt)$ is the set of divisions with aMFVC $M_{v}^{j}$ , it is clear that






On the other hand,










if only $W_{J}(C)$ exists
if no $W_{\sqrt}(C)$ exists.
(18)
$\{\begin{array}{lllll}\mathrm{B}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f} v^{1} \cdots ,v^{m} \mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e} \mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n} \mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e} W_{\sqrt}(C)\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}’ \mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{y} \end{array}\}$
Then $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}^{1}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(16),$ (17) and (18) the result (\"u) can be obtained.
LERA 3. Let $\sigma$ be any pemutation on $\mathrm{N}$ and $v^{k}$ be a singleton game for asimple game
$\mathrm{v}$.Then






The assertion of $\sigma_{j}^{-1}(C)=W_{v^{\mathit{1}}}(\sigma^{-1}(C))$ is equivalent to the assertion of $C(j)=W_{J}(C)$ .
Then from (20) and (21), we obtain $ov^{k}=v^{k}$ $(k=1,\cdots m)$ .
We propose anew axioms system which apower index should $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\Phi$.
$\mathrm{L}\mathrm{t}\pi(v)=\{\pi_{1}(v),\cdot\cdot.,\pi_{n}(v)\}$ be a power index vector for any game $v(\in G)$ .
&iom $A_{1}$ : $\pi_{i}(v)=0$ if and only if $\Gamma_{i}(v)=\phi$ .
(The power index is zero if and only if he is adummy player.)
&iom $A_{2}$ : For any Pemutation $\sigma$ on $\mathrm{N}$,
$\pi_{\sigma(i)}(ov)=\pi_{i}(v)$ for any $i(\in N)$ and any $v(\in G)$ . (22)
(Changing names ofplayers does not affect their powers.)
&iom $A_{3}$ : $\sum_{i=1}^{n}\pi_{l}(v)=1$ . (23)
$\mathrm{e}$ power index vector has the normalizafion property.)




oonvex lnear cambination of
$]$
(24)




for any $i(\in N)$ and any singleton
$\mathrm{g}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}v^{\iota}$ .
PROOF. The result is proved through four steps.
$(\mathrm{i})\mathrm{W}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}i\not\in M_{v}^{k}$ ,it is clear that $\Gamma_{j}(v^{k})=\phi$ , and therefore $\pi_{l}(v^{k})=0$ because of Axiom
$A_{1}$ .
(\"u)When $i \in M\oint,$ we shaU prove that $\pi_{l}(v^{k})$ is independent of $\mathrm{i},\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}$ is,
$\pi_{j}(v^{k})=\pi_{l}(v^{k})$ for any $\mathrm{j},$ $l \in M\int(j\neq l)$ . (26)
We consider apermutafion $\sigma$ on $\mathrm{N}$ defined by
$\sigma(i)=\{\begin{array}{l}li=jji=lii\neq j,l\end{array}$
(27)
Then byAxiom $A_{2}$ and Lemma 3, we obtain
$\pi_{j}(v^{k})=\pi_{\sigma(j)}(ov^{k})=\pi_{l}(v^{k})$ for any $j,l\in M_{v}^{k}(j\neq l)$. (28)
$(\ddot{\dot{\mathrm{m}}})\mathrm{W}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}i\in M_{v}^{k}$ , omitting the subscript , we can replace $\pi_{l}(v^{k})$ with $\pi(v^{k})$ because of






where $A=\mathrm{t}|\Gamma_{l}(v^{k})\neq\phi\}$ . Then $\pi(v^{k})=|M_{v}^{k}|^{-1}$ .
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$(\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v})\mathrm{W}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}$ $i\in M_{v}^{k}$ ,
$| \Gamma(v^{k})|^{-1}\sum|C(\beta_{i})|-1 =| \Gamma(v^{k})|^{-1}\sum_{CC\in\Gamma_{l}(v^{l})\epsilon\Gamma_{l}(v^{l})}|M_{v}^{k}|^{-1}$
$=|\Gamma(v^{k})|-\mathrm{l} \mathrm{x}|M_{v}^{k}|-\mathrm{l} \mathrm{x}|\Gamma(v^{k})|=|M_{v}^{k}|^{-1}$ . (30)
Then fiom (iii) and (iv), we obtain (25).
THEOREM 1. (i)The vector $\rho(v)=\{\rho_{1}(v),\cdot\cdot.,\rho_{n}(v)\}$ given by (5) satisfies Axiom
$A_{1}\sim A_{4}$ .
(ii) The power index vector satisfying Axiom $A_{1}\sim A_{4}$ coincides with the $\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\alpha \mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\rho(v)$ given
by (5).




$=\rho_{j}(v)$ . $\backslash$ (31)
$<\ \mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}A_{3}>$ :
$\sum_{i=1}^{n}\rho_{i}(v)=|\Gamma(v)|^{-1}\sum_{i=1}^{n}C\in\Gamma_{l}(v)\sum|C(\beta_{i})|^{-1}$
$=| \Gamma(v)|^{-1}\sum|C(\beta_{i})|-1 \mathrm{x}|C( \beta_{i})|C\mathrm{e}\Gamma(v)$
$=1$ (32)
$<\ \mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}A_{4}>$ :





where the second equalty is derived from Lemma 1.
$(\ddot{\mathrm{u}})\pi_{i}(v)$
$=\pi_{i}(v^{1}\mathrm{v}\cdot \cdot .\mathrm{v}v^{n})$ (by h a 2)
$=| \Gamma(\mathcal{V})|^{-1}\sum_{l=1}^{n}|\Gamma(v^{k}1^{\pi,(v^{k})}$
.










(by bmma 2) (34)
$=\rho_{i}(v)$ .
By Theorem 1, we know that the new index is aunique vector function $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\dot{\mathrm{h}}\mathrm{s}\mathfrak{H}\dot{\mathrm{m}}\mathrm{g}$ the above
axioms system.
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